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What is Philosophy for Children, What is
Philosophy with Children—After
Matthew Lipman?
NANCY VANSIELEGHEM AND DAVID KENNEDY
Philosophy for Children arose in the 1970s in the US as an
educational programme. This programme, initiated by
Matthew Lipman, was devoted to exploring the relationship
between the notions ‘philosophy’ and ‘childhood’, with the
implicit practical goal of establishing philosophy as a fullfledged ‘content area’ in public schools. Over 40 years, the
programme has spread worldwide, and the theory and
practice of doing philosophy for or with children and young
people appears to be of growing interest in the field of
education and, by implication, in society as a whole. This
article focuses on this growing interest by offering a survey of
the main arguments and ideas that have given shape to the
idea of philosophy for children in recent decades. This aim is
twofold: first, to make more familiar an actual educational
practice that is not at all well known in the field of academic
philosophy itself; and second, to invite a re-thinking of the
relationship between philosophy and the child ‘after Lipman’.
Philosophy for Children1 arose in the 1970s in the US as an educational
programme, initiated by Matthew Lipman (1922–2010), which was
devoted to exploring the relationship between the notions ‘philosophy’
and ‘childhood’, with the implicit practical goal of establishing philosophy
as a full-fledged ‘content area’ in US public schools—a goal that has, with
time, become an increasingly distant one. This is not so much the case in
the UK, Europe and Latin America, however, where the theory and
practice of doing philosophy for or with school age children appears to be
of growing both interest and concern in the field of education and, by
implication, in society as a whole. Examples of this emergent interest can
be found not only in the growing number of curriculum materials
published in this area, but in the many workshops and teacher training
courses devoted to practical philosophy that are organised for educational
practitioners, managers and teacher trainers.
This special issue focuses on the emergence of this ‘philosophy/child’
relation, and more precisely, on the horizon against which it has been born
and has taken shape. We attempt to locate the arguments that make it
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reasonable to think through the relationship between philosophy and the
child, and that clarify its significance for teaching and learning today. Our
aim is twofold: first, to become familiar with an actual educational
practice that is not at all well known in the field of academic philosophy
itself; and second, to offer an invitation to rethink the relationship between
philosophy and the child ‘after Lipman’. In this article, and as a means of
contextualising the different contributions to this issue, we provide an
introduction to some of the main arguments and ideas that have given
shape to the idea of philosophy for children in recent decades. In doing so,
we follow Ronald Reed and Tony Johnson (1999) in subdividing the
history of the movement into a first and a second generation.
Characteristic of the first generation was its emphasis on a strategic
uniformity of approach, given its ambitions for a place in public
schooling, while the second broke with this mode of thinking, and
welcomed difference as a principle of growth. This in fact fits our own
purposes, in that we are interested in envisaging philosophy for children
not so much as a totality, but rather as an assemblage of moving elements
that forms a particular horizon—and thus as ‘some-thing’ that is in
movement and can turn toward thought (cf. Deleuze and Guattari, 1994, p.
38). Hence, in what follows we focus not on one particular author or on
one ideological or methodological subgroup within the movement, but
rather attempt, first, to map the epistemological and pedagogical
discourses within which this set of discourses emerged.

ON PHILOSOPHY FOR CHILDREN: A FIRST GENERATION

In Modelle und Perspektiven der Kinderphilosophie (1997) Stephan
Englhart refers to three different horizons through which philosophy for
children became a matter of educational interest in the 1970s. We begin
with Matthew Lipman, whose arguments for the need for such a
programme were based on a notion of critical thinking that was strongly
influenced by the pragmatic philosophy of John Dewey. Enabled by
Lipman’s initiative, but migrating into a different but related discourse,
Gareth Matthews approached the issue more from a philosopher’s than an
educator’s point of view, and introduced a notion of philosophical
dialogue with children that was grounded in the adult appreciation of a
child’s inherent sense of wonder. Matthews (1980) emphasised the need to
rethink the child, not as an ignorant being, but as a rational agent who
already has the capacity to reason philosophically, and he thereby opened
a space for the emergent field of what is now known as philosophy of
childhood (Matthews, 1994; Kennedy, 1992). This moment of confluence
was clearly marked by a symposium held at the Eastern Division Meeting
of the American Philosophical Association in 1980, in which both
Matthews and Lipman presented papers,2 which were addressed by three
respondents. These were published in 1981 in a double issue of Lipman’s
journal Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children (2, 3 and 4),
accompanied by a rich literary compendium of childhood memoir, poetry,
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and philosophical and psychoanalytic reflection. Finally, following on
these two related approaches, another emerged that understood philosophy
for children as a means for reconstructing relations of power and agency in
the classroom, and for communicating and reflecting upon personal
meanings, with a goal of facilitating the self-actualisation of conscious
moral actors. In what follows we offer a brief overview of these different
lines of argument.

P4C AS A MEANS OF DEVELOPING CRITICAL THINKING SKILLS IN
AN EDUCATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The growing interest in critical thinking that emerged at the end of the
1970s was based on the conviction that an emphasis on reasoning was a
necessary element of any deep-structural educational reform, and that the
introduction of philosophy into the content of schooling represented the
one best curricular and pedagogical hope for bringing that element forth in
the culture and practice of schooling. The most important representative of
this approach at this time was Matthew Lipman, who developed the
philosophical novel Harry Stottlemeier’s Discovery (1974), which,
whatever its literary merits, established a new genre—the philosophical
novel for children—with a single stroke. Harry represents the attempt to
construct a pedagogical tool that functions as a model for critical thinking
by describing ‘real life’ children engaged in critical dialogue about
philosophical issues, with the goal of stimulating the same sort of dialogue
among groups of students. At the same moment, several approaches—a
revival of Leonard Nelson’s Socratic Method, in particular—emerged that
shared Lipman’s assumption that the stimulation of communal critical
thinking led to an improvement of thinking in the individual. Beyond that
similarity, however, Nelson (1882–1927) and Lipman differed in their
epistemic assumptions.
While Nelson’s ‘philosophical truth’ is located at the foundation of
experience, Lipman adopted an evolutionary view of knowledge.
Following Kant, Nelson believed that knowledge from observation
presupposes the application of categories that are not to be found through
empirical inquiry but are already present in the person and determine
experience itself. Thinking, in other words, is not derived purely from our
experience; rather, our experience is structured and made possible by
thinking. Nelson followed Kant in holding to the categories of a priori
thinking but differed in his claim that these a priori categories cannot be
proven. It is substance and causality not just in the external world that are
knowable by induction, but in the inner world as well. For Nelson,
knowledge of the truth is internal, is traceable in and through the
conceptual presuppositions of everyday experience, and is gained by
regressive abstraction from those experiences. As such, truth can be
brought to light by a ‘psychological factum’ (Nelson, [1975] 1994), which
entails introspection and the painstaking dissection of one’s own
experience. The search for a common order of things is no longer
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undertaken on the level of human nature, but is based on the connections
that materialise in the experience of the individual person. It is as if the
truth is present in everyone but needs to be made transparent through the
method of regressive abstraction. Here we are dealing with a specific
methodology that shows step-by-step how a person can achieve objective
knowledge concerning her own thinking.
In his interpretation of the Socratic method Lipman turned not to Kant
but to pragmatism. Although the trunk and branches of Lipman’s
programme can be identified with G. H. Mead, Lev Vygotsky, C. S.
Pierce and Justus Buchler, its roots are clearly in the philosophical
writings of Dewey (Lipman, 1996, pp. xi-xv). Lipman began with
Dewey’s idea that there is no distinction between the mind and the
external world and, as a consequence, between philosophical truth and
scientific truth (cf. Daniel, 1992; McCall, 2009, p. 102). Influenced by
Darwin, Dewey had developed an evolutionary view of knowledge, which
implies an ongoing adaptive human response to a changing environment.
As a consequence, and in line with Dewey, knowledge for Lipman is not
static, but the emergent product of a ceaseless interaction with the
environment. Dewey used the word ‘experience’ to explain this
interaction, and understood thinking as reflection on the consequences
of this interaction, and thereby on the possibilities of further experience.
Dewey wrote: ‘Reflection involves not simply a sequence of ideas, but a
consequence—a consecutive ordering in such a way that each determines
the next as its proper outcome, while each outcome in turn leans back on,
or refers to, its predecessors’ (Dewey, 1933, p. 4).
What this means is that thinking enables persons to become aware of the
consequences of their actions and thereby to reconstruct those habits from
which actions follow. This does not imply that success is guaranteed; but
because we have nothing at our disposal that offers us more certainty than
the outcome of reflection, it is incumbent upon us to strengthen the
reflective quality of our feelings and our actions, however counterintuitive
that may appear to ‘common sense’. While Dewey connected this effort to
the ongoing reconstruction of habit through experience, Lipman went
further and emphasised the efficacy of formal logic in the formation of
judgments and the growth of ‘reasonableness’ (see Daniel, 1992). This is
not merely about mapping diverse possibilities that may be realised but
about the search for possible incorrect presuppositions in the activity of
thinking. Accordingly, for Lipman, critical thinking means being able to
determine the facts or issues (including ideas, concepts and theories) that
cause a problem in order to make hypotheses about how to solve it.
Moreover, the logic of the development of knowledge in a given
environment and the application of knowledge for the improvement of the
quality of living became the horizon against which Lipman’s Philosophy
for Children programme took shape. Accordingly, the aim of P4C for
Lipman ‘is not to turn children into philosophers or decision makers, but
to help them become more thoughtful, more reflective, more considerate,
and more reasonable individuals. Children who have been helped to
become more judicious not only have a better sense of when to act but also
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of when not to act’ (Lipman et al., 1980, p. 15). Against this background,
philosophy is no longer regarded as a theoretical activity separated from
the world, but rather as a potential that has to (and can) be developed in
order to get a grip on one’s interactions with one’s environment, and to
influence change.

PHILOSOPHY FOR CHILDREN AS A MEANS OF CLOSING THE GAP
BETWEEN THE ADULT AND THE CHILD

A second line of argument that entered the discourse on philosophy for
children at the end of the 1970s focuses on the emergent topos of the
philosophy of childhood. In these approaches, which are often described
as Romantic, the notion of childhood as merely a prelude to adulthood is
problematised. These studies, amongst which the work of Gareth
Matthews is particularly prominent, criticise traditional education for
limiting its focus to the transfer of knowledge and, thus, underrating the
voice of the child. ‘Children can help us adults investigate and reflect on
interesting and important questions and . . . the children’s contributions
may be quite as valuable as any we adults have to offer’ (Matthews, 1984,
p. 3). Matthews explicitly strives for a symmetrical relation between the
adult and the child, and approaches the child as an equal companion in
thought. Therefore he does not speak about philosophy for or with
children, but rather ‘dialogues with children’, and argues that children ask
the same questions as philosophers do, although differently formulated.
In his book Philosophy and the Young Child (1984), Matthews launched
a philosophical critique of Piaget’s claim that young children are ‘prelogical’ and incapable of what Piaget called ‘formal operations’. In so
doing, he was in effect questioning the foundational genetic epistemology
of the American educational establishment, whose teachers were (and are)
socialised from the start into a naive version of developmental, Piagetian
discrete stage theory, which itself has been the object of criticism among
cognitive scientists for decades (see Brainerd, 1978). Matthews argued
that Piaget’s theory displayed an ‘evolutionary bias’ in assuming that the
goal of development is maturity, and that each stage of development
represents an advance (Matthews, 1994, p. 17). This does not hold for the
development of philosophical intelligence, Matthews suggests, and in fact
the opposite may be the case: children are likely to ask more interesting
questions than adults. ‘The standard response’, he writes, ‘is, in general an
unthinking and un-thought-out product of socialisation, whereas the
nonconforming response is much more likely to be the fruit of honest
reflection. Yet Piaget would have the nonconforming response discounted
and eliminated on methodological grounds’ (Matthews, 1980, p. 38).3
Correlatively, Matthews argues that the central mission of the school
should be to create spaces in which children can articulate and explore
their own interpretations of the world and bring these into dialogue with
others. Critical thinking means not so much instrumental problem-solving
as the capacity and the disposition to fantasise and to wonder, to entertain
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profound ideas about the world and to confront problems concerning
individual well-being. Logical thinking skills are not emphasised in this
approach, or even the discovery of inconsistencies or contradictions in
ideas, but rather philosophy as a form of desire—of the opportunity for
children to explore and articulate what they have not said or even thought
before. As such, philosophy’s boundaries shift under the influence of
childhood, and it opens itself to the expression even of what can not be
said, thus intersecting in its practice with art, psychotherapy and what
Pierre Hadot called askesis, or ‘spiritual exercise’ (Hadot, 1995).4 Thus,
the experience of interacting philosophically with children results in a
profound critique of the normative adult view of the child and of its
expression in the ‘science as usual’ of developmental psychology, which
becomes exposed as a sort of epistemic ideology immersed in a discourse
that is unaware of its own philosophical assumptions (see Polakow, 1982).
In fact this critique finds its justification in developmental psychology
with the arrival in the West, contemporary with Lipman’s pioneering
innovation, of Vygotskian learning theory, which represents a challenge to
Piagetian stage theory that has not yet been internalised by institutionalised education, not surprisingly perhaps, given its structural asymmetry
with traditional educational assumptions and practices.

P4C AS A STRATEGY TO RECONSTRUCT MECHANISMS OF POWER
AND TO COMMUNICATE AND REFLECT UPON PERSONAL
MEANINGS

Although clearly related to the previous lines of reasoning, a third
(Englhart, 1997, p. 138) is to be found in the attempt to strive for a more
human world—that is, a world that is free from any preordained
orientation to what constitutes human thinking and action. Here
philosophy appears as a form of communal deliberation that stimulates
critical reflection on existing power relations, these being envisaged as
historical constructions that are or should be open to reconstruction. An
exploration of these constructs is expected to bring into the light the
invisible relationships of power that inform them, thereby neutralising
their force. This project calls for a form of education whose fundamental
discursive engine is dialogue, which privileges inquiry over instruction
and the multilogical rather over the monological. Dialogue as a form of
speech inherently resists the reification of ideas or practices and trades
instead on clarifying essences, postponing judgements, working with
ambiguities and interrogating assumptions, these being achieved through
dyadic or group deliberation. Its discursive goal is the installation of a
Habermasian ‘ideal speech situation’, a free space in which all persons
involved in the inquiry have an equal chance to bring their arguments
forward in the interest of a an emergent, rationally founded consensus.
Ekkehard Martens (1999), one of the proponents of this approach, writes
that children need to learn that there are different orientations possible,
that no orientation can be claimed as the only one, and that the practice of
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philosophical inquiry is necessary in order to learn to think beyond
totality, dualism and exclusionary categories.
Martens suggest that two dimensions need to be present in designing a
philosophical curriculum and pedagogy for children: on the one hand,
motivational content, or what he calls ‘homeric themes as food for their
souls to grow’, and, on the other, a critical method of thinking modelled
on the dialogical style of Socrates, identified as a ‘philosophical
spoilsport’ or ‘gadfly’ (Martens, 1999, p. 138). This approach finds the
value of philosophy in its capacity to encourage a historically sensitive,
trans-cultural approach to knowledge, in the interest of refining students’
powers of detailed analysis and their ability to reach judgements through
communicative action based on collaborative interpretation. This also
presumes an emphasis on the cultivation of the art of speaking (rhetoric),
questioning (dialectic) and writing (grammar), and the strengthening of
casuistic reasoning in service of ethical action. Here thinking for oneself
implies that one takes responsibility for one’s actions, and it assumes that
the capacity for responsible action is an outcome of growth in
philosophical knowledge and procedures. Philosophy is then understood
as a means of increasing the potential power of children (who are defined
as essentially vulnerable) in order to neutralise unequal power relations by
strengthening processes of communication and cooperation.
A SECOND GENERATION OF PHILOSOPHY FOR CHILDREN: A
‘METHOD’ BECOMES ‘A MOVEMENT’

Today a second generation of ‘P4C-representatives’ has emerged within
the discourse of philosophy for children—including, among others, Ann
Margaret Sharp, David Kennedy, Karin Murris, Walter Kohan, Michel
Sasseville, Joanna Haynes, Jen Glaser, Oscar Brenifier, Michel Tozzi,
Marina Santi, Barbara Weber and Philip Cam—in whose work received
ideas have been called into question and new thinking has taken form. It is
characteristic of this generation that these new ideas are not considered an
attack on its predecessors but as a necessary step that takes into account
the changing circumstances of the global and educational environment
and, hence, are understood as a form of self-correction. Ronald Reed and
Tony Johnson write, for example:
Given the rise of post modernity, one simply does not do philosophy the
way one did it forty years ago. The assumptions about truth, perspective,
nature and so on have, at least, been challenged, thereby forcing attempts
at justification and explanation that were considered unnecessary in
previous days. To the extent that philosophy has an impact on everyday
experience, to that extent the debate has had practical consequences (Reed
and Johnson, 1999, pp. 64–65).

The most obvious object of the second generation’s critique is Lipman’s
strong emphasis on analytical reasoning as a guarantee for critical
thinking. As Karel Van der Leeuw puts it, ‘In the novels, but especially in
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the accompanying manuals, stress on analytical skills, reasoning,
categorizing, ordering, and so on, is pervasive. It is not immediately
apparent, however, how improvement of analytical skills is conductive to
the discovery of meaning’ (Van der Leeuw, 2009, p. 111). In addition, the
regressive, instrumentalist structure and discourse of 21st century Western
traditional schooling is understood as particularly antithetical to the goals
and purposes of philosophy for children. ‘Reflection and reasoning’, van
der Leeuw suggests, ‘can’t be realized when we only reserve separate
hours a week for a collective exploration of philosophical questions’ (p.
112). He argues that, in our changing information society,
. . . we expect people to be able to reflect rationally on human life, which
includes a view of reality, of the place of the individual in society, of
values and norms, of the meaning of life and so on. [And] . . . we expect
them to be able to communicate these views to others, because we live in
a common reality, and this common reality must be the subject of
common discourse, and can even be regarded as a common construct
(Van der Leeuw, 2009, p. 113).

Accordingly, philosophy is not perceived primarily as a provider either of
skills or ‘answers’—whether in the realm of fact or value—but as a site in
which students can determine what the important questions for our time are,
and where they can seek their own answers through the practice of thinking
for themselves and with others in communal deliberation. ‘Every
generation’, Van der Leeuw claims, ‘has to find answers, because the world
is changing and widening’ (ibid.). What is needed, on this account, is an
integrated educational system with an infrastructure that offers opportunities
for reflective thinking and communication and that will serve to prepare us
for the inevitable transformation in our attitudes towards knowledge. As
such, the central mission of the school is to teach children how to think and
communicate: to train them how to reflect upon knowledge on their own.
Striving for unity and consistency, and subjugating our thinking to
logical categories or to universal reason, are no longer, for this second
generation, ends-in-themselves. In consequence, we find that speculations
about methods and approaches tend to be contextualised to particular
communities, and the only broad consensus that does exist is that
philosophy for children is about promoting the exchange of rational
argument and thoughtful opinion. There is, however, no longer understood
to be one best way of reasoning, for collective reason, it is held, is shaped
and articulated by the social community in which it operates. Now
philosophy for children becomes philosophy with children. The change in
the preposition is an important index of difference: it betokens a still
greater emphasis on dialogue as fundamental and indispensable to the
pedagogy of philosophy, which is no longer understood as the modelling
and coaching of an ideal of analytical reason, but as what generates
communal reflection, contemplation and communication. In this respect,
the second generation will no longer speak about philosophy for or with
children in terms of a method, but rather as a movement encompassing a
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medley of approaches, each with its own methods, techniques and
strategies.
Now it may be suggested that the logic of ‘what works’ is bound to be
marked by aspects of what has been called, following Michel Foucault, the
‘biopolitical structure of society’. Understood as an adaptation—or
capitulation—to biopower, whatever critical potential philosophy for
children carries, and whatever notion of freedom it endorses, have come to
be associated with a particular work upon the self—a work that is oriented
to the fulfilment of human needs or desires in a community. On this
account, a particular subject(ivity) comes to the fore in the discourses of
philosophy with children themselves—a subject who looks at her life in
terms of a process that can be managed and who experiences philosophy
as an efficient tool for that purpose (see Vansieleghem and Masschelein,
2010). In this respect it could be said that philosophy for children,
whatever its efforts to resist doing so, has not remained unaffected by the
general cultural movement that has replaced critique with sales promotion,
reinforcing our dependence on an exploitative apparatus that, in satisfying
our needs, perpetuates our servitude (see Marcuse, 1964). Biopower seeks
a totality, and philosophy for children may be both an instrument and an
effect of a power that generates a totalising vision not only for a child but
also for a people and humankind as a whole.
On the other hand, it could be argued, in the light of Foucault’s (2005)
final turn to the ‘care of the self’ as an ethical practice, that the practice of
philosophy for children represents a dispositif in the service of an
emergent form of subjectivity, a ‘global class formation’ (2004, p. xvii)
that Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2004, 2009), following Spinoza,
call ‘multitude’. Here they reformulate the concept of biopolitics as the
form of collectivity of ‘altermodernity’ (2009, pp. 101–118), a collectivity
of singularities for which the articulation between the social and the
political grows ever more intense: the innovative and creative capacities
that capitalism demands for its expansion produce forms of resistance to
capitalism, intensities that manage from within it to produce alternative
expressions’ (2004, p. 263), and through which ‘the multitude can develop
the power to organize itself through the conflictual and cooperative
interactions of singularities in the common’ (2009, p. 175). ‘Communication’, they argue, ‘is productive, not only of economic values but also
of subjectivity, and thus communication is central to biopolitical
production’ (p. 263). This is to suggest that the discursive form that
characterises philosophy for children—communal dialogue in an ideal
speech situation—is inherently subversive of the goals of biopower, and as
such represents a sort of Trojan Horse wheeled into the ideological state
apparatus of Western schooling.

RETHINKING PHILOSOPHY/CHILDHOOD—AFTER LIPMAN

Against the backdrop of these multiple views on the implications of
philosophy for children as a discourse, a methodology, a philosophical
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enterprise, and a form of biopolitical production, this special issue is the
outcome of an invitation to think the project philosophy/childhood,
childhood/philosophy again and anew. After all, what philosophy for
children may become is by no means a given: it is, as Gilles Deleuze and
Félix Guattari might put this, created rather than formed, as is made clear
by the shifts that our brief genealogy has charted. Hence, philosophy for
children does not just appear as a solution to a problem. It emerges within
a given field of experience, where it combines with other coexisting
theories and practices that gives it a history and a determination as well as
constituting it as an opening to something new. Thus, this collection of
articles takes note not only of the question of what philosophy for children
is, but of what determines its moment of emergence, the particular
conditions of that emergence, and of what remains unknown as well—and
this not only at a theoretical level but also in the spaces of concrete
educational practice. There are contributions here not only by friends of
philosophy for children but also by its doubters and antagonists as well,
thus opening a space for confrontation and challenge to received views.
We would like to think of this special issue as an intervention that creates
the possibility of verifying and affirming philosophy for children as a
possible theory and practice—as a theory and practice that has a history
and that has linked up with other theories and practices, that corresponds
to other concepts and presupposes other philosophies and other
subjectivities. Moreover philosophy for children will not be presented as
a well-defined occupation and more or less precisely circumscribed
activity, but rather as a concept that is created and that remains subject to
the constraints of renewal, replacement and mutation. As a result, the
articles collected here are not simply analyses, interpretations or
conceptual clarifications: what they offer is not a presentation of
philosophy for children as an object of knowledge: it is the presentation
of a subject that is subjective. Hence, this special issue is an attempt to
think philosophy for children beyond existing representations and to create
thereby a hyper-representation, from which new meanings, new forms of
social expression, new forms of empowerment, new forms of encounter
and new forms of collective action may emerge.
Correspondence: Nancy Vansieleghem, Department of The Foundations
of Education, Ghent University, Belgium; David K. Kennedy, Department
of Educational Foundations, Montclair State University, Montclair NJ
07042, USA.
Emails: Nancy.Vansieleghem@UGent.be; kennedyd@mail.montclair.edu

NOTES
1. The use of the term ‘philosophy for children’—now commonly ‘P4C’—has been the subject of
some contention, especially among European practitioners, for two reasons: (i) the term, it is
claimed, rightly describes one particular curricular programme, developed and published by the
Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children, and therefore should not be used
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generically; (ii) the word ‘for’, it is alleged, has certain paternalistic connotations, implying that
the activity is something that adults provide for children, or furnish them with, as opposed to
something they practise with them. In consequence, many consider the term ‘philosophy with
children’ more appropriate. Here and throughout this special issue we have used three forms of
the term, depending on the author and the context: ‘Philosophy for Children’ when referring to
the IAPC programme in particular, and either ‘philosophy for children’, ‘philosophy with
children’ or ‘philosophy for/with children’, depending on the author’s preference.
2. Lipman’s paper was entitled ‘Developing Philosophies of Childhood’, and Mathews’,
‘Childhood: The Recapitulation Model’.
3. Matthews and Lipman were, in turn, challenged directly by the philosophical establishment in
the person of Richard Kitchener, who attended that same meeting of the APA in 1980, where he
argued in Piagetian terms against children’s capacity to do philosophy. He later published a
paper summarising his arguments (Kitchener, 1990), which was followed by an even more
exhaustive critique by John White (1992). The arguments of both papers were contested by Karin
Murris (1999) in the pages of this journal.
4. In fact, Lipman offered a ‘prototype’ of philosophical community of inquiry that included five
steps or stages (the ‘offering of the text’, the ‘construction of the agenda’, etc.) the last of which
calls for the ‘eliciting of further responses in the form of telling or writing stories, poetry,
painting, drawing . . .’ (Lipman, 2003, pp. 101–103).
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